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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: STRESS RELATED INJURY
IN THE WORKPLACE*

University of Florida v. Massie, 602 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1992)
Respondent applied for modification of a previous order by the
Deputy Commissioner of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security' that denied him workers' compensation benefits
for the disabling aggravation of his multiple sclerosis, allegedly caused
by job-related stress. 2 The Deputy Commissioner denied Respondent's
request for modification. 3 On appeal, the Florida First District Court
of Appeal reversed the denial and remanded the case. 4 On a petition
for review,5 the Florida Supreme Court quashed the appellate court
decision and remanded with directions that the Deputy Commissioner's
order be affirmed, 6 and HELD, that Respondent was not entitled to
workers' compensation for exacerbation of his multiple sclerosis, 7 because the awarding of compensation for job-related stress that exacer-

* Editors Note: This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding case
comment submitted in the Fall 1992 semester.
1. University of Fla. v. Massie, 602 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1992). Respondent in this case was
employed as Director of Engineering for a television-radio station. In his original application
for workers' compensation benefits, Respondent asserted that excessive work hours, extending
up to 18 hours a day and for up to seven days a week, coupled with the stress of being pressured
by the FM Station Manager to purchase equipment in a manner that did not comport with state
regulatory and statutory requirements, imposed stress that exacerbated his multiple sclerosis
("MS"). Id. at 518. The exacerbation of his MS ultimately resulted in Respondent's inability to
work. Id. In denying Respondent's claim for compensation, the Deputy Commissioner found
that the stress to which the Respondent was subjected was not greater than that to which the
general public is exposed. Id. at 519. Further, the Deputy found that stress is in the nature
of a psychological trauma, and therefore not compensable. Id. On Respondent's appeal, the
Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's (Massie I) finding
and reasoned that expert testimony indicated Respondent's stress was not "unusual" and that
job stress was difficult for "everyone." Id.
2. Id. at 518.
3. Id. at 520.
4. Massie v. University of Fla., 570 So. 2d 963, 977 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1990). In reversing
the Deputy Commissioner's denial of benefits, the appellate court (Massie II) said that the prior
decision was predicated on an erroneous factual premise which resulted in "manifest injustice."
Id.
5. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 517.
6. Id. at 526-27.
7. Id. at 526.
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bates a pre-existing physical defect is contrary to the existing workers'
compensation statute."
Historically, workers relied on the common law of tort liability to
seek compensation from employers for job-related injuries.9 However,
the claims were frequently defeated.10 Seeking to rectify the injustices
12
of the system,' states enacted workers' compensation statutes.
In Florida, the workers' compensation statute provides coverage
for employees injured through course of employment. 13 Although there

8. Id.
9. Christy DeVader & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Reducing Managerial Distress About
Stress: An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternatives for Reducing Stress-Based Workers' Compensation Claims, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1990).
10. Id. at 2-3. Prior to enactment of Workers' Compensation statutes, workers injured in
the course of employment could seek recovery for their injuries only by suing the employer
under the common law of tort liability. Id. at 2. Since the courts required the injured worker
to prove fault by the employer, the claims usually failed. Id. Employers were usually able to
successfully defend against the claims by proving assumption of the risk, contributory negligence,
or the fellow servant rule. Id. If an employee was successful, the amount recovered seldom
compensated his loss of income. The awards generally covered little more than medical expenses
and legal fees. European legislatures were first to address the problem by enacting statutes.
Id. Maryland was the first state to initiate a workers' compensation statute in 1902. Id. at 3.
By 1911 twenty-five states had passed similar statutes. Id.; see also Thomas Cook, Workers'
Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 879 (1987) (estimating 80% of injured workers unable to recover for job related
injuries before workers' compensation statutes passed); Letitia Mallin, Note, Disease, Not Accident: Recognition of Occupational Stress Under the Workmen's Compensation Laws, 13
COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 357 (1988) (stating compensation laws enacted to reduce burden on
worker injured because of his job); Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry., 220
U.S. 590 (1911) (denying recovery to widow of worker killed in course of employment because
of worker's contributory negligence when attempting to couple railroad cars); Meunier v. Chemical Paper Co., 61 N.E. 810 (Mass. 1901) (denying recovery to employee for hand injured in
course of employment because of employee's failure to use due care); Loynes v. Loring B. Hall
Co., 80 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1907) (denying compensation to employee for injury sustained to hand
while operating equipment on job because "risk was an obvious one").
11. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 528. The policy driving the initiation of workers' compensation
turned on the notion that society, as opposed to the injured worker, should bear the burden of
industrial accidents. Id.; see also Francis Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1912). The theory was that if employers assumed
the cost of employee injury, ultimately the cost would be passed on to consumers through
increased prices. "The consumer should bear, as part of the cost of the article which he uses,
all the loss which its manufacture entails, including the destruction and impairment of the human
instrument of manufacture .. " Id. at 330.
12. WEX MALONE ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 37
(1980) (stating that when Mississippi adopted a workers' compensation statute in 1949, the
system became universal).
13. FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (1992). Section 440.09 reads in pertinent part, "(1) Compensation
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are jurisdictions that accept mental stress as sufficient causation to
support a workers' compensation claim for a physical injury, 14 the
Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the Florida Statute 5 as not
allowing compensation for an injury based on mental stress.16 In denying claims averring job-related stress, the court has reasoned that
stress is common to most jobs 17 and, therefore, does not meet the test
for compensable injuries first articulated in Victor Wine & Liquor,
Inc. v. Beasley. s

shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the
disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in course of employment." FLA.
STAT. § 440.09(1) (1992).
FLA. STAT. § 440.02 defines injury as, "(17) 'Injury' means personal injury or death by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as
naturally or unavoidably result from such injury .... This damage must specifically occur as
the result of an accident in the normal course of employment." FLA. STAT. § 440.02(17).
FLA. STAT. § 440.02 defines accident as:
(1) "Accident" means only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening
suddenly. A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright or excitement only, or
disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a venereal
disease or a disease due to the habitual use of alcohol or controlled substances or
narcotic drugs, shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of
employment. Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated
by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration
of death or acceleration or aggravation of the preexisting condition reasonably
attributable to the accident shall be compensable, with respect to death or permanent impairment.
FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (1992). This subsection was numbered 440.02(18) in 1981 when Respondent's employment with Petitioner was terminated. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 521 n.4.
14. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.21(a) (1992). In
the category of where a distinct physical injury results from a mental stimulus the decisions
find compensability. Id.; see Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (awarding
compensation to an insurance company claims adjuster for disability resulting from a heart
attack that was caused by "overwork, and physical and mental strain"); Schechter v. State Ins.
Fund, 160 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1959) (awarding compensation to an attorney for disability arising
from heart attack suffered as a result of his increased trial workload); Streeb v. City of Boulder,
706 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1985) (holding that job-related mental or emotional stress may constitute
causation for a compensable injury in case where fireman died from cardiac arrhythmia).
15. FLA.STAT. § 440 (1992).
16. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 524-25. The court said: "We are not willing to redefine workers'
compensation coverage to include situations where psychological causes may have physical effects. The legislature is the appropriate body to take such action." Id.
17. Id. at 524.
18. Id.
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In Victor Wine,1 9 a claimant sought workers' compensation benefits
2
for a heart attack, which he suffered in the course of his employment. 0
The Victor Wine court held that claimant was not entitled to workers'
compensation benefits because a heart attack suffered by an employee
while performing his usual job activities, without unusual physical
' 21
exertion, was not deemed to be a compensable injury by "accident."
The court reasoned that for relief to be granted under the Florida
Act, the injury must be caused by a hazard of the industry. 2 Further,
the court reasoned that to compensate an injury that was not caused
by an accident of the industry would be against the purpose of the
act and would amount to health insurance.Y The Victor Wine court
found that the claimant suffered the heart attack in the course of his
routine job activity. Therefore, he was not subjected to unusual strain
or overexertion that was uncommon to the work he was accustomed
to performing,2 and his claim was dismissed.However in a subsequent case, the Florida Supreme Court found
a stress-induced claim to merit compensation in Tracy v. Americana
Hotel.- In Tracy, the claimant was a hotel housekeeper who suffered
a ruptured aneurysm in the course of her employment. 27 The rupture
was alleged to be caused by job-related stress combined with normal
job activity.- In holding that the injury was compensable under workers' compensation benefits,- the Tracy court reasoned that a claimant
need only show that she experienced an injury as an unexpected result
of her job activities.30 Therefore, since the claimant suffered an unexpected aneurysm in the course of her employment activities, the court
held that she was entitled to compensation. 31

19. Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962). The claimant in this
case was a laborer who had two non-disabling heart attacks several days before suffering the
disabling attack in the course of performing his usual job activities of lifting, carrying and
stacking cases of whiskey on a truck. Id. at 583.
20. Id. at 583.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 584.
26. 234 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
27. Id. at 642. The claimant suffered a ruptured aneurysm while in the process of "snapping"
a bed sheet across a mattress, following a stressful incident involving a co-employee. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 643.
30. Id. at 642.
31. Id. at 643.
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However, the court receded from the Tracy holding in Richard E.
Mosca & Co. v. Mosca.2 The Mosca court denied workers' compensation benefits to a claimant for a ruptured aneurysm that allegedly
resulted from job-related stress. 3 According to medical testimony in
Mosca, a decline in the claimant's business exerted sufficient stress
to elevate his blood pressure to the point that the aneurysm ruptured.3
In denying compensation to the claimant, the Mosca court reasoned
that a ruptured aneurysm could not qualify as an "accident" arising
out of employment, absent evidence of a specific and identifiable effort
of overexertion or strain that was uncommon to the work the claimant
usually performed.- In addition, the court said emotional strain had
never been held to be a sufficient cause to support a workers' compensation claim. 37 Articulating the policy underlying the denial of stress
related claims, the court said that emotional strain was too elusive a
factor, absent a physical factor,a to determine a causal connection
between a claimant's injury and his employment.39 The Florida Supreme Court held that the claimant did not show that his injury resulted from a specific and unusual strain or overexertion that was not
routine to his type of work.40 Subsequent Florida cases continued to
deny stress based claims of physical injury. 41

32. 362 So. 2d 1340, 1342 n.2 (Fla. 1978). The court indicated that the Mosca holding
receded from the Tracy holding insofar as Tracy was inconsistent with the Mosca holding. Id.
33. Id. at 1344.
34. Id. at 1341-42.
35. Id. at 1344.
36. Id. at 1342.
37. Id. The court said:
[I]n no case have we held emotional strain alone to be sufficient. Emotional strain
is too elusive a factor to be utilized, independent of any physical activity, in determining whether there is a causal connection between a heart attack or other internal
failure of the cardiovascular system and the claimant's employment.

Id.
38. See Mosca, 362 So. 2d at 1344. The court cited a case in which a heart attack was
found to be a compensable injury where there was unusual physical strain in conjunction with
emotional strain. Marhoefer v. Frye, 199 So. 2d 723, 723-24 (Fla. 1967) (holding that the death
of an employee, who was foreman of a major construction project and subject to unusual strain
and overexertion when he suffered a fatal heart attack, was a compensable claim). Id.
39. Mosca, 362 So. 2d at 1342.
40. Id. at 1344.
41. E.g. City of Miami v. Rosenberg, 396 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1981) (denying compensation to
attorney who suffered heart attack alleged to be caused by stress of pressure on him to retire);
Richards Dept. Store v. Donin, 365 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978) (denying compensation to a department
store buyer who suffered myocardia infarction alleged to result from pressure of excessive work

combined with the threat of losing his job).
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In contrast to the Florida position, the Court of Appeals of Oregon
has held that stress based claims are compensable,4 based on the
Oregon workers' compensation statute.A In Abbott v. State Accident
Insurance," a claimant was granted compensation for the exacerbation
of her multiple sclerosis, 45 allegedly caused by the stress of her job
as a legal secretary. 46 The Oregon court first reasoned that the state
statute provided compensation for disease or infection arising out of
and in the scope of the employment.47 Next, the court reasoned that
the claimant's work was unusually stressful and that stress exacerbated her multiple sclerosis." Finally, the court stated that stress can
be a causative factor in a workers' compensation case and accordingly
49
held that the claimant was entitled to compensation.
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court, in a four to three
majority opinion, stated that in denying compensation to the Respondent, it adhered to the principles established in Mosca and Victor
Wine.- The court reasoned that a claimant was not entitled to compen-

42. See Globe Machine v. Yock, 717 P.2d 1235 (Or. App. 1986) (awarding worker compensation for disabling injuries caused by alcoholism, which in turn was alleged to be caused by
job-stress); State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. v. Carter, 698 P.2d 1037 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)
(awarding compensation to a state senator for permanent injuries resulting from exacerbation
of his multiple sclerosis caused by the stress of grand jury investigation); Abbott v. State
Accident Ins. Fund, 609 P.2d 396 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (awarding compensation to a legal secretary
whose multiple sclerosis was exacerbated to the point of disability by the stress of her employment).
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.005 (1991). Section 656.005(7)(a) states:
(7)(a) A "compensable injury" is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical
services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is
an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is established by medical
evidence supported by objective findings, subject to the following limitations: (A)
No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury
unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential
condition. (B) If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or
condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant
condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains
the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.
Id.
44. Abbott, 609 P.2d 396.
45. Id. at 398.
46. Id. at 397. The claimant was a legal secretary for an attorney who maintained a caseload
of four-hundred to five-hundred open files. She was described by co-workers as a workaholic. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 398.
50. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 522.
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sation unless the circumstances of his case constituted an "accident"
as defined by the Florida Statute. 51 Comparing the case to similar
cases where the claimants each suffered a heart attack,52 the court
reasoned that the test for a compensable injury clearly required an
occurrence of physical strain or exertion as stated in Victor Wine.The court further stated that for a pre-existing injury to be compensable, the injury must be exacerbated by some nonroutine, job-related
physical strain, or by a form of repetitious physical trauma.- The
court said the physical strain might, or might not, be accompanied by
psychological stress. 55 The court noted that under Florida law,
psychological stress alone is not a sufficient causation in a workers'
7
compensation claim, 56 and only legislative action could alter that rule.5
Citing the principle that all employees in managerial positions are
periodically subjected to stress,5 the court held that Respondent's
job-related stress was neither uncommon to his job, nor a valid physical
'59
occurrence constituting an "accident.
However, in a vigorous dissent, Justice Shaw said that by denying
Respondent's claim in the instant case, a "manifest injustice" occurred ° Justice Shaw criticized the majority for transmuting the
"physical strain requirement" of Mosca into requiring a "physical
stimulus" in order to meet the causation requirement for a workers'
compensation claim.61 Further, he agreed with the Oregon court in
Abbott 2 that a claim of exacerbated multiple sclerosis is compensable
when shown to be "causually connected" to job-related stress. - Finally,
in pointing out the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act,- Jus-

51. Id. at 521 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (1989)); see supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
52. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 521.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 524.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 525.
58. Id. at 524.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 527 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 527 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
63. Massie, 602 S. 2d at 527, 528 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (quoting State Accidental Ins.
Fund Corp. v. Carter, 698 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1985)).
64. Id. at 528 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (quoting Mobile Elevator Co. v. White, 39 So. 2d 799,
800 (Fla. 1949) "[I]f the worker is 'hurt while [engaged in the employer's activity], then the
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tice Shaw stressed the importance of the social policy underlying workers' compensation.6
Although the instant court stated that it followed the principles
established in Victor Wine and Mosca, it appeared to raise the
threshold for sustaining a claim for injury under the Florida Workers'
Compensation Statute. In Victor Wine, the claimant suffered a heart
attack in the course of his routine work.6 In contrast, the Respondent
in the instant case suffered an exacerbation of his multiple sclerosis
as a result of excessive work hours and psychological pressure. 67 By
requiring an identifiable physical stimulus as impetus for a compensable "accident," as opposed to allowing compensation for excessive
physical strain or uncommon exertion, the instant court appears to
heighten the requirement for meeting the compensability test. In requiring a specific physical trauma as causation for a compensable injury, the court gave the statutory definition of "accident" a narrow
69
construction.
Furthermore, in finding that Respondent was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits, the court reasoned that the rationale laid
out in Mosca was also applicable to the instant case.7- Applying the
language of Mosca, the instant court said that "emotional strain [was]
too elusive a factor" and had never been held by the court to be
sufficient alone to warrant compensation. 7 1 The instant court stated
that testimony regarding Respondent's mental stress was irrelevant
and should have been disregarded under the law.Although the injury sustained by the claimant in Mosca was dissimilar to that of the Respondent in the instant case, work-related
stress precipitated the injuries of each. 73 As in Mosca, the instant

employer who benefits or profits from that activity must relieve society of the consequences of
a broken body, a diminished income, an outlay for medical and other care."')
65. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
66. See Victor Wine, 141 So. 2d at 581; supra note 19.
67. See Massie, 602 So. 2d at 518; supra note 1.
68. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 518, 527 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 524. The court said, "[I]n order for a pre-existing condition to be compensable,
it must be exacerbated by some nonroutine, job-related physical exertion, or by some form of
repeated physical trauma." Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
70. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 522; Mosca, 362 So. 2d at 1342.
71. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 522.
72. Id. at 525. The court reasoned that testimony regarding psychological stress need not
have been considered by the Deputy Commissioner in determining whether Respondent's injury
was compensable because the court said that stress is not compensable as a matter of law unless
it is accompanied by physical exertion or physical trauma. Id.
73. See supra notes 1 and 32.
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court held that absent specifically identifiable, physical strain, uncommon to the routine work of the claimant, psychological trauma is not
compensable. 74 In emphasizing that injuries caused by mental stress
are not compensable, the instant court indicated that the only opportunity for compensating a stress-related injury would be through legislative action. 75
Unlike the Abbott court, the Mosca court and the instant court
did not recognize a compensable "accident" as a result, but rather as
an impetus. Under the Abbott holding, the unexpected element constituting an accident was the exacerbation of the claimant's multiple

sclerosis, as opposed to the stress that caused

it.76

However, in the

instant case, the court determined that to be compensable, causation
of the injury must fall within the meaning of "accident" as connoting
a specific, identifiable physical stimulus. 77 Therefore, the instant court
did not recognize the extraordinary conditions of Respondent's job as
satisfying the "accident" element. 78
As in Abbott, the rationale in the Tracy case was based on result
as opposed to cause. Although the claimant in Tracy suffered from a
ruptured aneurysm, 79 as opposed to multiple sclerosis, the circumstances are analogous in the respect that both claimants suffered
a pre-existing condition that was exacerbated by job-related stress.
However, the Florida court receded from the Tracy holding in Mosca8°
and its progeny l by looking to a physical catalyst in an injury for

74. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 526-27; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 526. The court stated, "We believe that Massie II is based upon
the view that workers compensation should be awarded when a claimant's pre-existing physical
defect is exacerbated by job-related stress. Whether or not we agree with that view, we find
that it is contrary to the existing workers' compensation statute and it would be improper for
the courts to so amend that statute." Id.
76. Abbott, 609 P.2d at 398.
77. Massie, 602 So. 2d 516. The court stated in pertinent part, "We must answer two
questions in resolving this case. First, do the circumstances of Massie's case constitute an
,accident' for purposes of workers compensation?" Id. at 521.
The court further stated that, "no witness ever testified to an incident of nonroutine physical
exertion, exposure to some deleterious substance or extreme environmental condition, or repeated physical trauma. As there was no such testimony, the deputy commissioner's factual
determination was not improper." Id. at 525.
78. Id. at 526, 527.
79. Victor Wine, 141 So. 2d at 583; see also text accompanying note 24.
80. Mosca, 362 So. 2d at 1342.
81. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also Tintera v. Armour & Co., 362 So.
2d 1344 (Fla. 1978) (denying compensation to employee who suffered myocardial infarction
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determination of benefits under workers' compensation. While the
Florida court adopted a more liberal view of workers' compensation
in Tracy, it resumed a conservative position in Mosca that still prevails. The instant court appears to adopt an even more conservative
posture.
In maintaining a conservative position regarding the scope of workers' compensation coverage, the court narrowly construes the state
statute. Several policy considerations appear to drive this conservative
position. The first consideration is that the statute as construed does
not extend coverage to stress-induced injuries. Therefore, the appropriate body to address for expansion of the coverage is the legislature.The second policy consideration is the incorporeal characteristic of
stress, which makes it difficult to identify or quantify;8 third, is the
responsibility of individuals to maintain independent health care coverage;- and last, is the slippery slope theory, which is premised on the
idea that most people are subject to stress in their jobs.As workers' compensation statutes seek to protect the interests of
4 ' jurisdictions are divided
workers injured through their employment,1
s7
as to the scope of what constitutes a compensable employment injury.
While a number of states are liberal regarding coverage of stress-induced injuries under workers' compensation statutes,8 Florida remains
conservative. States allowing compensation for stress-induced injuries
are responding to the shift from an industrial labor force,89 traditionally
plagued by physical accidents and injuries, to the computer-age work
force, plagued by stress-related injury and illness.Although Florida remains conservative in its denial of compensation
for stress-related injuries, it is interesting to note that Florida courts
have taken an opposite position in respect to retirement benefits for

allegedly caused by stress of potential job lay-off); Skinner v. First Fla. Bldg. Corp., 490 So.
2d 1367 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1986) (denying compensation to widow of worker whose death was
attributed to a ruptured aneurysm allegedly caused by job-related stress).
82. Massie, 602 So. 2d at 526.
83. See Mosca, 362 So. 2d at 1342.
84.
85.
86.

See Victor Wine, 141 So. 2d at 583.
See Massie, 602 So. 2d at 524.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
87. Occupational Disease: Insurance Issues, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE REPORTS (Ruth Gastel ed., Mar. 1992). Editor states that only ten states require that a form of
physical injury must have occurred before a claim for mental or emotional injury can be filed. Id.
88. See supra note 43; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108 (1991).
89. Nancy Blodgett, Legal Relief From Tension, 72 A.B.A. JOUR., Oct. 1, 1986 at 17.
90. Id.
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employees disabled as a result of job-related stress. 9 This balancing
suggests how justice may be served by denying compensation to a
disabled worker who would be a healthy wage-earner "but for" the
stress of his employment, while a co-worker suffering a corporeal
injury is compensated? Although the position of not compensating
stress-induced injuries appears callous, there are valid arguments on
behalf of the underlying policies.
First, as the court in Mosca said, stress is elusive and therefore,
difficult to quantify. 9- It is hard to determine how much stress is too
much. It is hard to isolate the stress of employment from the stress
of other areas of an employee's lifestyle. Second, and perhaps more
significant, is that broadening of coverage could devastate the financial
foundation of the system. 93 While social policy dictates a sense of
responsibility for the victim of a stress-induced injury or disability,
consideration of the allocation of resources suggests a pause for examination of potentially conflicting factors. If stress-related claims become
universally compensable, the state or employers' financial pools may
be depleted. 94 Either the system could fail, 95 or the price of consumer
goods and services could increase to offset increased workers' compensation premiums. 96 Therefore, careful analysis is indicated in order to
balance competing interests and arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.
Judith P. Erwin

91. See Division of Retirement v. Allen, 395 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (finding
in-line-of-duty disability benefits for correctional officer who suffered a stroke allegedly caused
by highly stressful job); Division of Retirement v. Putnam, 386 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
(finding in-line-of-duty disability benefits for sixty-one year old school teacher who suffered a
stoke allegedly caused by extraordinary stress of job).
92. Mosca, 362 So. 2d at 1342.
93. DEVADER & GIAMPETRO-MEYER, supm note 9, at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Without Restraints, Control of System Inefficiencies, Study Shows W.C. Costs Can
Double Again in Next Five Years, INSURANCE ADVOCATE, Dec. 22, 1990, at 5. Indicates
reasons for sharp increases in costs of workers' compensation are rising medical costs and
expansion of work-related injury to include stress disorders. Id.

